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IN SERVICE:10-8 
 
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across British Columbia. 
 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER 
 
The “In Service:10-8” newsletter is a publication of the 
JIBC Police Academy.  No glossy paper, no fancy 
pictures, just plain “black letter” bringing you, the front 
line officer, up to date and current with issues facing 
you on the street. It is our intention to bring you this 
newsletter on a regular basis. You are free to copy this 
publication and pass it on to your colleagues. Copies of 
“In Service:10-8” will soon be available online at the 
Police Academy website at www.jibc.bc.ca. 
 
PLAIN VIEW: SEEING IS 
BELIEVING 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
 
The common law “plain view” 
doctrine authorizes the non-
consensual seizure of property 
obtained without a warrant. 
The police are not expected 
to "turn a blind eye to things 
in plain view that evidence, or 
raise suspicions of illegality1". 
In a sense, plain view is an exception to the rule 
requiring a search warrant2. This doctrine is a seizure 
authority only and is unconnected to the law of search3. 
Although plain view permits the seizure of items by 
police lawfully present it does not allow the officer to 
effect a warrantless search through areas unrelated to 
the reason for attendance nor into areas the police do  
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1 See Belnavis & Lawrence v. the Queen (1997), 118 CCC (3d) 405 (S.C.C.) at para. 
57. 
2 R. v. Ruiz (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 500 (N.B.C.A.) at p.509. 
3 R. v. Smith (1998) 126 C.C.C. (3d) 62 (Alta.C.A.) 
 
not have lawful authority to intrude or otherwise be 
present4. A plain view seizure does not involve a 
significant further invasion into a person's privacy 
beyond what initially placed the officer at the location. 
Plain view serves only to supplement the prior 
justification.  
 
Fundamental Requirements 
 
Plain view will justify a seizure if the following conditions 
are satisfied5: 
 
• lawful presence at the location where the object 
of seizure is found6 
• the discovery of the object of seizure is 
inadvertent7 
• it must be immediately apparent the object of 
seizure (evidence, contraband) is subject to 
seizure8. 
 
Lawful Presence 
 
The police officer must have prior justification, by 
warrant or otherwise, to be in the location and position 
to view the evidence seized. Lawful prior intrusion may 
include the execution of a search warrant, search 
incident to lawful arrest, hot pursuit, consent, implied 
licence to enter, or some other legitimate reason for the 
officer's presence. Prior intrusion could be unconnected 
with a search of the individual altogether and may 
include entry into an apartment to assist the landlord 
with an emergency water leak9. Succinctly, the 
lawfulness of the seizure turns on the legality of the 
intrusion that permitted the police to view and physically 
seize the property in question.  
 
 
                                                 
4 R. v. Knee 2001 ABPC 23 at para.50. 
5 R. v. Kyllo [1999] B.C.J. No.717 (B.C.S.C.) at para.48. 
6 R. v. Belliveau (1986) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (N.B.C.A.), R. v. Ruiz (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 
500 (N.B.C.A.) , R. v. Askov [1987] O.J. No.1626 (Ont.D.Crt) 
7 R. v. Belliveau (1986) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (N.B.C.A.), R. v. Ruiz (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 
500 (N.B.C.A.) 
8 R. v. Belliveau (1986) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (N.B.C.A.) 
9 R. v. Shea  (1982) 1 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (Ont.H.C.J.) 
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 Inadvertent Discovery 
 
The police officer must inadvertently discover the 
evidence. Accordingly, the officer may not know in 
advance the location of the evidence and, intending on 
seizing the evidence, use plain view as a pretext to 
legitimize the seizure. However, having a suspicion or 
even knowing in advance that evidence will be found does 
not necessarily render the seizure unreasonable10 
provided the intrusion was not a ruse merely to cause 
the item to be in plain view. The discovery of an item 
through an affirmative search does not amount to 
inadvertence11.  
 
Apparently Subject to Seizure 
 
The police must have reasonable grounds to believe the 
item subject to observation may be evidence of a 
crime12, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The 
officer must be more than "merely suspicious"13. Police 
action in some circumstances, like opening a package, will 
be treated as plain view. If the contents of the 
container or package may be inferred from the outward 
appearance of the package or container, the opening 
does not necessarily intrude upon any reasonable 
expectation of privacy14. 
  
Limitations 
 
Because plain view is a seizure authority only and does 
not authorize a search15, plain view may not be relied 
upon to extend a search from one object of focus to 
another. For example, where police enter a residence 
under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen 
items, this doctrine allows the officer to seize drugs in 
plain view without retreating from the residence and 
obtaining a secondary warrant authorizing the seizure of 
the drugs. However, police are not entitled to expand 
the focus of the original search warrant from stolen 
property to now include drugs. If the police wish to 
expand the search to include the search for drugs, the 
officer must obtain a secondary warrant.  Alternatively, 
the officer may continue the legitimate search for 
stolen property and if further drugs come into view the 
officer may seize them provided the officer does not 
exceed the scope of the original warrant. 
                                                 
10 R. v. Fitt (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 341 (N.S.C.A.) at p. 346 affirmed (1996) 103 C.C.C. 
(3d) 224 (S.C.C.) 
11 R.  v. Nielsen (1988) 43 C.C.C. (3d) 548 (Sask.C.A.) at p.556. 
12 R. v. Lalibert (1995) SKQB QB9550. 
13 R. v. Dreysko (1990) 110 A.R. 317 (Alta.C.A.) 
14 R. v. Brennan [2000] O.J. No.3257 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.70. 
15 R. v. Smith 1998 ABCA 418 at para17. 
 
The police are not limited to only the officer having 
observed the item in plain view participating in the 
seizure of that item. An officer who is lawfully present 
in a premise may seize evidence and retain possession 
over the evidence while awaiting the arrival of further 
assistance. Entry of additional police officers to assist 
the seizing officer does not render the seizure 
unreasonable16.  
 
"Plain smell" does not authorize the engagement of the 
plain view doctrine unless the odour provides the 
reasonable grounds to believe the item already in view is 
apparently evidence. When an officer who is present in a 
premise such as a dwelling house detects a unique smell 
believing marihuana is present elsewhere in another part 
of a dwelling, the officer is not entitled to search for 
the origin of the smell and then rely on the plain view 
doctrine to justify its seizure17. 
 
 
IMPLIED LICENCE: 
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Have you ever wondered why 
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police are entitled to walk up to 
and talk up the occupants of a 
dwelling? The common law has long 
recognized an implied licence for 
all members of the public, 
including the police, to approach 
the door of a residence and 
knock18. Implied licence however, 
relates to the approach to the dwelling, not to the 
premises generally19, and ends at the door of the 
residence20. When a police officer acts "in accordance 
with this implied invitation, they cannot be said to 
intrude upon the privacy of the occupant21" and do not 
engage in unconstitutional activity22. Implied licence 
extends only to those activities for the purpose of 
                                                 
16 R. v. Shea (1982) 1 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (Ont.C.H.J.) 
17 R. v. Smith 1998 ABCA 418 at para 24. 
18 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J. at para. 13, per Major J. at 
para. 40, R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198, R. v. Hallet [1967] 2 All E.R. 407,  
19 Anderson v. Smith 2000 BCSC 1194. 
20 R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (Ont.C.A.) at p. 203. 
21 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J. 
22 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
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 communicating with the occupant and anything beyond 
this “licenced purpose” is not authorized by implied 
licence. Synonymously, implied licence is known as 
implied invitation, invitation to knock23, implied 
invitation to attend24, implied licence to enter, or door 
knocking. 
 
Scope of Implied Licence 
 
In determining whether the activity of the police fell 
within the implied licence doctrine, the "underlying 
purpose or intent" of entry onto the property from the 
perspective of the police must be considered and 
carefully assessed25. In R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 
(S.C.C.), police attendance by acting on an anonymous 
tip and knocking at the door for the purpose of 
securing evidence against the owner (by sniffing for 
marihuana odour) exceeded the scope of implied 
licence. However, circumstances where the police are 
not investigating the occupant or are "in the legitimate 
pursuit of evidence"26 may be lawful uses of implied 
licence. In R v. K.L & S.L. 1999 BCCA 3727, police 
attendance at the residence of the accused to 
determine whether the accused owned a pair of shoes 
similar to the type of footprint left at the scene of a 
robbery "was a natural step in a series of enquiries in 
an investigation of possible suspects". The court found 
the "visit" of the police to the residence did not violate 
s.8 of the Charter. A circumstance where the sole 
purpose of the police officer is to ask questions of the 
homeowner, even investigative questions, does not 
exceed the bounds of implied right to approach and 
knock28. 
 
The approach to the residence will generally import the 
"requirement of a direct approach to the front door-
not a trespassory detour elsewhere on the property to 
secure evidence29". Since the purpose of implied 
licence is to enable a person, police officer's included, 
to reach a point in relation to the house where normal 
and convenient communication may occur, an open porch 
door may constitute an invitation to proceed past the 
porch door to the outer door of the house proper30. 
Likewise, an approach to a dwelling that necessitates 
driving on a driveway and through some trees leading to 
the residence does not fall outside the scope of implied 
licence31. However, the act of surreptitiously looking 
through windows of a house, amounting to a perimeter 
search, goes beyond any waiver of privacy rights 
implied through the invitation to knock doctrine32. 
Similarly, visual observations by police (noting a bright 
light and condensation) at a basement apartment 
window made from a side-yard at a distance of two 
inches, was a violation of a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy33. 
                                                 
                                                
23 R. v. Peters [1998] B.C.J. No.156 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 
(Ont.S.C.J.) at para.28. 
24 R. v. Piasentini [2000] O.J. No.3319 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
25 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.),  R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No. 59 (Ont.C.A.) 
26 Anderson v. Smith 2000 BCSC 1194 
27 Police attended the residence of the accused and spoke to his mother. Upon 
questioning of whether her son owned a pair of Converse Illusion brand shoes she 
presented, on request, the shoes. 
28 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.33,  
29 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.35. 
30 R. v. Bushman (1968) 4 C.C.C. 17 (B.C.C.A.) 
 
A business establishment open to all members of the 
public impliedly invites those members to enter and 
there is no breach of privacy when a police officer 
enters the area of the premises to which the public is 
impliedly invited34. However, the police will be 
restricted from accessing private, non-public areas of 
the business under implied invitation35. The implied 
invitation respecting a business establishment will be 
dependent on the circumstances and nature of the 
business. 
 
Implied licence also "extends to situations where the 
very purpose of entry is to protect the interests of 
the property owner or occupant" provided the police 
officer has a reasonable suspicion (articulable cause) 
that criminal activity is being perpetrated against the 
owner or occupant of the property36.  In R. v. Mulligan 
[2000] O.J. No.59 (Ont.C.A.) Sharpe J.A. held: 
 
“It is plainly in the interests of a property owner or 
occupant that the police investigate suspected crimes 
being committed against the owner or occupant upon 
the property.  For that reason, absent notice to the 
contrary, a police officer may assume that entry for 
that purpose is by the implied invitation of the owner, 
particularly where entry is limited to areas of the 
property to which the owner has extended a general 
invitation to all members of the public.” 
 
In R. v. Hern [1994] A.J. No.83 (Alta.C.A.) police 
entered a residence in response to a complaint of a 
break and enter in progress. While inside police 
discovered a marihuana grow operation. In determining 
 
31 R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No.1165 (B.C.C.A.) 
32 R. v. Peters [1998] B.C.J. No.156 (B.C.S.C.) 
33 R. v. Laurin (1997) 113 C.C.C. (3d) 519 (Ont.C.A.) 
34 R. v. Fitt (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 341 (N.S.C.A.) at p.346 affirmed (1996) 103 C.C.C. 
(3d) 224 (S.C.C.), R. v. Kouyas [1994] N.S.J. No.567 (N.S.C.A.) 
35 R. v. Kouyas [1994] N.S.J. No.567 (N.S.C.A.) 
36 R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No,.59 (Ont.C.A.) 
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 the reasonableness of the police entry and search of 
the residence, the Court found “an inference can be 
drawn that the owner would welcome police to stop a 
break-in and protect the residents". 
 
Revoking Implied Licence 
 
Implied licence may be revoked on notice by the 
occupant37. Revocation may be done in advance of police 
attendance by the posting of signs38 such as "No 
admittance to police officers39" or by oral revocation 
while the police are on the property. Once the occupant 
revokes or withdraws the implied licence, they must 
provide a reasonable opportunity for the police to 
leave40. If a police officer is assaulted while departing, 
a conviction of assaulting a police officer will stand41. 
If circumstances arise that would otherwise permit the 
officer to remain on the property, such as effecting an 
arrest, the implied licence revocation would not require 
the officer to leave.  
 
A police officer who is lawfully on property under 
implied licence who finds an occupant of that property 
committing an offence, may arrest that person and the 
subsequent arrest and continued custody will be lawful 
regardless of whether the occupant revokes the 
implied licence42. If the property owner withdraws the 
implied licence before the officer has grounds to make 
the arrest, the police officer must leave the property 
or risk becoming a trespasser. For example, where 
evidence of impairment was obtained after the implied 
licence was revoked causing the officer to be a 
trespasser, the officer is no longer acting in the lawful 
execution of his duty43. However, if grounds for arrest 
came into existence before the implied licence was 
withdrawn, the police are lawfully entitled to arrest. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“It is the nature of police officers to be suspicious. 
Indeed, a suspicious nature is one of the positive 
attributes of a competent police officer. But the 
Constitution stands between suspicion and the 
citizen44”. BCCA Justice Wood. 
                                                 
                                                
37 R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No. 1165 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Bushman (1968) 4 C.C.C. 17 
(B.C.C.A.) 
38 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) 
39 Robson v. Hallet (1967) 51 Cr.App.R. 307 per Diplock L.J. 
40 R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (Ont.C.A.) at p. 205 leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
41 R. v. Forsyth [1982] B.C.J. No. 469 (B.C.S.C.) 
42 R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No. 59 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No. 1165 
(B.C.C.A.) 
43 R. v. Smith [1999] B.C.J. No. 908 (B.C.S.C.) 
 
 
SINK or SWIM AT THE JI 
Sgt. Tammy Schellenberg and Sgt. Frank Querido 
 
Swimming has been added to police recruit physical 
training at the JI in partnership with the Canada 
Games Pool and Fitness Centre. Basic swimming and 
survival skills are taught. For those who can’t swim, a 
life jacket will be provided!!! 
 
BC COURTS ONLINE 
 
Did you know that all three BC Court levels now have a 
web-site where you can access judicial decisions? Search 
engines are easy to use and you may query key words. 
Try running your own name and check for decisions of 
cases in which you were involved.  
 
BC COURT OF APPEAL 
 www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
BC SUPREME COURT 
 www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
BC PROVINCIAL COURT 
 www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“It would be impractical to expect of an officer 
swearing an information [to obtain a search warrant] in 
these circumstances the precise prose of an Oxford 
grammarian, the detailed disclosures of a confessional 
and the legal knowledge of a Rhodes scholar45”. BCCA 
Justice Gibbs. 
 
WANTED: FEEDBACK 
 
 
44 R. v. Martin(1995) 97 C.C.C. (3d) 241 (B.C.C.A.) affirmed S.C.C. 104 C.C.C. (3d) 
224. 
45 R. v. Melenchuk (1993) 24 B.C.A.C. 97 (B.C.C.A.) 
 
 
For comments or topics you would like to see 
published in this newsletter contact  
Sgt. Mike Novakowski at the JIBC Police Academy 
at (604) 528-5733 or e-mail at 
mnovakowski@jibc.bc.ca 
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